Thoughts from Kyiv on Russian regime change – 20 June 2014

wMychailo Wynnyckyj, June 21, 2014

Yesterday, I met with a group of analysts from Europe and the US brought to Kyiv by the Public Diplomacy Division of NATO. My remarks were deliberately provocative (I voiced the idea of “regime change” in Russia as a viable NATO policy objective) because I am convinced that actual policies implemented by bureaucracies are generated as compromises between extreme positions. I presented an idea that represents an extreme in the hope that the real policy will perhaps not be as radical as my proposal, but at least will be more proactive than the status quo. A synopsis of my presentation during yesterday’s breakfast meeting follows.

The strategy of NATO, the EU, and the G-7 towards Russian aggression in Ukraine has been reactive. Almost 3 months have passed since Putin’s outrageous violation of the post-Cold War world order. The state of shock in international community diplomatic circles should have worn off by now, but surprisingly, political elites appear to be immune even to seemingly lunatic encroachments on Europe’s established borders. Indeed the fact that Putin’s defiance of international law is so blatant, and the Kremlin’s justifications for such action are so completely unorthodox (patently opposite from the truth), leaves one to believe that the only possible diagnosis for Putin’s state of mind is lunacy.

I will not attempt to get inside Mr. Putin’s head. Multiple publications have appeared on this topic, and none are sufficiently explanatory, nor are they helpful in the long term. Short term tactics require an understanding of the possible moves (and therefore of the motives that determine desirable options) of one’s adversary. But this is reactive thinking. If one is to break out of the paradigm of battle tactics, reaching further into strategy, one needs to look at the war as a whole. What are the aims of the West with respect to Russia?

Clearly, the old paradigm of seeking economic and political cooperation/competition within a set rule framework, and concomitant respect for the mutual interests of international players, is no longer a valid option: Russia simply refuses to play by the rules, and regardless of how much the Kremlin is urged to return to the established institutional framework, mutual trust has been undermined to such an extent that it will never be restored.

Does this state of affairs inevitably mean a return to Cold War styled global separation? This is clearly not a desirable option in western capitals: firstly, because few wish to believe that a real ideological divide exists between Moscow and the rest of the world (after all, the Russians are nominally “capitalist” – just like “us”), and secondly, most recognize that the difference between “Cold War” and “frozen conflict” is semantic rather than substantive – maintaining a status quo of arrested conflict requires continuous effort, life in the disputed territory (i.e. economic and social development) is suboptimal, and risk of return to violence is always high. In other words, if Russia (Putin) is to be contained, the West had better be prepared to pay a very high and long-term price for it.

Is there another solution? From a West European perspective, that question depends on several values-based decisions:

1) Where does the border of Europe lie? Or (put differently) is Ukraine truly European, and is conflict on its border any of Europe’s business? In other words, does NATO, the EU, the G-7, OECD, or any other western institution have any obligation to protect the territorial integrity of Ukraine? This issue would be much clearer if Ukraine were a NATO member or part of the EU – clearly then the answer would be “yes” because of treaty and institutional obligations. But under the circumstances, any evaluation of Ukraine’s “European-ness” is dependent on one’s image and understanding of the Maidan – the only instance in history of mass deaths in the name of European values: national self-determination, personal dignity, rules-based government. My previous posts (and my presentation yesterday) have focused on these issues extensively. During the past 6 months, Ukrainians have demonstrated their European-ness more than many citizens of EU countries (including restraining from violence in Crimea); the decision is now up to the Europeans – will they accept Ukrainians as their own?

2) Can Europe tolerate a neo-fascist government in Russia? I thank Prof. Alexander Motyl (a participant in the NATO analyst mission) for this formulation because, in the past, I have not been brave enough to call the current Kremlin regime what it is. Apparently, comparisons between Putin and Hitler are not well received in western intellectual circles these days, but the fact that during the run-up to the EU Parliamentary elections, every single European extreme right party proclaimed support for the Kremlin’s policies towards Ukraine (see Prof. Timothy Snyder’s numerous publications on this), makes one wonder why identifying the Russian as neo-fascist should be considered illegitimate by mainstream politicians. Western democracies have an ugly history of tolerating authoritarianism when it is in their economic interests, and of ignoring atrocities that such regimes perpetrate. This time, will the EU look the other way while Russia perpetrates ethnic cleansing, territorial annexation, and subsidizes terrorism on Europe’s borders? Does Slovyansk (or another city in the Donbas or Crimean peninsula) have to turn into a Srbrenica before the West actually takes a stand, or can we avoid mass killings? Will history books condemn 21st century Europe’s return to 19th century style “Realpolitik”, or will the West do what is right?

3) Is the EU’s proclaimed post-modernist “soft power” foreign policy a reality, or have we in fact become a world where “might mean right”? Putin’s flagrant violations of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, and of the international institutional order have been left mainly unchallenged thus far. Limited economic sanctions have been implemented, Russia has been expelled from the G-7, and its membership in several European institutions has been suspended, but Crimea remains occupied, and mercenary fighters in eastern Ukraine continue to be funded and supplied from Russia. The EU has prided itself on projecting “soft power” (e.g. M. Leonard’s “Why Europe will run the 21st Century” 2005), but soft power only works when one’s neighbors are democracies (i.e. where public opinion matters), and when policy is shaped by rational pursuit of national self-interest (i.e.  a regime cares about the economic welfare of its citizens). Although one of the NATO officials present during my breakfast meeting yesterday was keen to point out that Putin enjoys over 80% support in Russia, as anyone who has watched even a little Russian television will attest, it is patently absurd to argue that such support originates from a well-informed electorate. Furthermore, Russia’s economic disparities (even according to official statistics) are so glaring that it is hardly believable that the Kremlin cares at all about the livelihood of average Russians.

Europe’s soft power is based on values – their proclamation, protection, institutionalization in everyday life, and then projection as an attractive example. Certainly, Russia does not (and cannot) offer a soft power alternative to rival the EU. However, if western politicians continue to maintain a reactive stance towards Putin’s “hard power” aggression in Ukraine, the legitimacy of the EU’s soft power will be undermined, as will the political institutions that engender its core. Indeed, some (e.g. Prof. Snyder) have argued that this in fact is the Kremlin’s goal: to undermine the absolute and objective advantage of the EU model, so as to improve the attractiveness in relative terms of the “Eurasianist” alternative political project.  From this perspective, Ukraine is a test of the valor of Europe, and of all that it stands for.

For the moment, Europe stands for reaction – and limited reaction at best. Generating a proactive policy requires a goal. Strategy cannot be formed if an “end state to be achieved” by implementing the strategy is not envisioned. This may seem obvious, but it is the crux of the current problem faced by Europeans (and by the US as the senior partner in NATO). Put simply: if the regime in Russia is a problem (globally), then what alternative is more desirable?

This is a question that most policymakers simply refuse to ask. Because Russia has nuclear weapons, and because any alternative to a centralized authoritarian regime in the Kremlin would create a risk of losing control over that nuclear arsenal, one simply does not ask the “what is the alternative?”  question. Indeed, this was exactly the motivation behind President George Bush Sr.’s “Chicken Kiev Speech” – delivered in the Parliament of the Ukrainian SSR in 1991, several weeks before the August coup which led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and to its dissolution into constituent republics. At the time Mr. Bush stated outright that the United States would “never support suicidal nationalists” who questioned the long-term viability of the USSR, and of Mr. Gorbachev as its leader. President Bush turned out to be wrong. Questioning the viability of the USSR is exactly what the West should have done, and then it would have been better prepared when the “evil empire” in fact disintegrated.

However, the analogy is not precise: the dismemberment of the Russian Federation is clearly not a desired outcome for the West. Firstly, the emergence of multiple states on the former territory of Russia, each armed with nuclear weapons, and with nascent governments which may or may not be respectful of non-proliferation agreements is a high risk scenario for each NATO member, and for the alliance as a whole. Secondly, it would take time and effort to arrange for normal trade relations with multiple states, and therefore it is likely that energy supplies to the EU would be threatened if Russia disintegrated. Doing business with two countries (Russia and Ukraine) is difficult enough – the scenario of having to arrange gas contracts with even more supply and transit partners must seem nightmarish to Europe’s energy moguls.

Notwithstanding the growing number of people in Ukraine that see the disintegration of the Russian Federation as a desired outcome of the current conflict in the Donbas, a viable Russia strategy for NATO and the EU (i.e. a policy guided by a desired visionary goal) need not be based on dismemberment of Ukraine’s eastern neighbor. After-all, the international community’s problem is not the Russian Federation as such (as was the case when the USSR existed), rather it is with the Russian regime.

Yesterday I first voiced the phrase “regime change” as a viable end-goal of a NATO policy vis-à-vis Russia. My suggestion was met with a predictable response from the multinational group of analysts whom I was meeting: “Regime change was tried in Lybia and Iraq, and look where it got us?” To which I responded: “True, but look where it got us in the case of Slobodan Milosevic?” Serbs (and Kosovars, Bosnians, and Montenegrans) are certainly better off today without the Balkan dictator – an authoritarian who justified expansionism based on ethno-nationalist fervor, and who happened to enjoy high levels of popularity at the time when he was forced from office. As in the Russian case, it was highly unclear who would take power in Serbia after Milosevic, but that did not stop NATO from doing what was right for Serbs and right for Europe. Of course, the risks were not as high: Serbia did not have nukes…

Several years ago, during an event organized by the Pinchuk Foundation’s Yalta European Strategy, I had an opportunity to chat extensively with Mario David – Vice President of the European People’s Party, and a prominent EU legislator. Recollecting his conversation on EU-Russian relations with a highly placed Russian diplomat (the topic was Latvia) Mario, a native of Portugal, pointed out that “Portugal now borders Russia”. After-all, he told me, EU foreign policy is Portuguese foreign policy…

If I were to engage Mario David today, I would ask him: does the Portuguese border extend southward from the Baltics to Luhansk? Formally – no. Therefore the EU is right to say it has no formal obligation to protect the territorial integrity of Ukraine. But what about the moral obligation? Many of the protesters who died on Maidan were buried with ribbons marked with a circle of gold stars on a blue background…  Should that not be moral reason enough to at least implement a “no-fly zone” patrolled by NATO fighter aircraft over eastern Ukraine?

At the moment, no one is calling for “boots on the ground” in the Donbas (that would be unrealistic anyway), but today’s reports of renewed troop movements on Russia’s western border, and video footage of tanks bearing Russian flags moving through Luhansk oblast, indicate that Putin has no intention of reducing the intensity of his aggression against Ukraine. For the moment he still has the initiative. Some have placed high hopes in President Poroshenko’s peace plan (announced today) which involves Ukrainian troops ceasing hostilities for 7 days to allow Russian mercenaries to leave the country, or to face destruction next week. OK – that’s Plan A, and I genuinely hope it works. But what’s Plan B?

And what is the West’s long-term strategy with respect to Mr. Putin? Containment is an option, but that will be expensive. To maintain its status as a buffer state, Ukraine must become a showcase for EU soft-power, and a huge recipient of NATO military assistance – i.e. a kind of post-war Germany and late 20th century Israel wrapped into one. Can the EU, US and Canada afford to provide that kind of assistance? Wouldn’t it be cheaper to just get rid of the threat? That requires guts…

In the meantime, over 150 Ukrainian soldiers have died in the Donbas protecting Europe’s eastern border. How many more must come home in flag-covered coffins before the Kantian moral imperative (so loudly proclaimed as the basis of Europe’s values) is transformed into a policy imperative by NATO/EU/G-7 leaders?

God help us!

Mychailo Wynnyckyj PhD, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy

Source: FB

Continue reading


Ukraine update: Incoming tanks, sanctions and EU caution

By Dmytro Tuzov

On June 19, 25 armored vehicles crossed Ukraine’s border from Russia through the Dovzhansky checkpoint: a convoy of APCs, curtain-sided KamAZ trucks, an AA gun, and three Grad-type multiple rocket launchers. Another armored column under Russian flag moved to the village of Rubizhne from the city of Luhansk. Militant sources report that they have as many as 250 T-64 tanks. The armed insurgents have been using their websites to claim the capture of vehicles from Ukrainian army depots. Continue reading

Today, the Future of Russia Looks Frightening

Aleksey Lebedinsky


Today, the future of Russia looks frightening. I have fear. Really, I do.

I am frightened because Russia has Putin. You certainly know why.

However, I would be frightened if Russia lost Putin. Because for the last 15 years, the people in Russia were deprived of the opportunity to get acquainted with any decent and well-educated person who would be able to win the people’s trust, and also to take over the governing of the country and its people given the pathetic shape they are in right now. Therefore, if Putin goes, his place will be taken by one of his courtiers, who has his hands and his thoughts as dirty as Putin’s. Things might get worse.

So, Putin or no Putin, nothing good will happen to my dear, beloved country in the foreseeable future. Nothing good will happen to my family, close friends, colleagues, and, generally, to all the decent and luminous people of Russia, because they cannot be brownnosers. That makes me especially afraid.

And it is not the current regime that instills fear in me. Rather, it is this aggressive and merciless howl of the Russian lumpen-proletariat, of the people who have gone mad in their looking forward to the approaching slaughter. These people have no historic memory whatsoever. They are ready to rename their cities, again, honoring the names of the murderous maniacs who have arranged the genocide of their own people, the sadists who are obviously guilty in wiping out millions of human lives – including the lives of grandfathers and great-grandfathers of these very lumpen-proletarians.

The crowd that has gone mad, the crowd of men and women who have lost all their reason and memory, is a terrifying thing. On the other hand, the genes have the memories of their own, and these genes are waking up, and they are the ruthless genes of those whose ancestors used to be executioners and secret agents, the bloody hands and the heartless toy soldiers of the regimes that rid themselves of humanity, the regimes where it was normal to betray a person’s mother or child, reporting them to the secret police. And why did these ancestors of the contemporary Russians do all those terrible things? What for? Ask the contemporary Russians – and you will see that they still cannot quite understand that or sort that out. They remind me of the scene from an old Soviet movie, “Chapaev,” where one Red Army commander is asked by his aid-de-camp, “Are you fighting for Bolsheviks or for Communists?” The commander looks bewildered, but then says: “I am for the International!” The aid-de-camp asks, “For which International, for the First or for the Second? The commander gets totally confused, but then blurts: “For whatever Lenin is, I am fighting for that, too!”

These people have instantaneously swallowed the bait thrown into their brains, crippled by cheap movies about the Chechen war or about brave Russian troops liquidating domestic terrorists or even Mexican drug cartels. Their minds are also made foggy by the Russian government campaigns aimed at banning Americans from adopting Russian children (the so-called “Law of Dima Yakovlev” and the like). And what is this bait? Well, it is the contemporary “Russian National Idea.” This idea is simple, although impossible to explain or prove rationally. It is the idea that Russia is far superior to all other countries and that a Russian person is far superior to a person of any other nationality in the whole world. Moreover, this idea implies that Russia is somehow more important for a Russian than the life and freedom of his or her own children.

So this crowd is triumphantly carrying this precious National Idea, which, no doubt, will very soon develop into the Idea that it is OK to physically kill anyone, including your own neighbors, friends, or colleagues merely for their thoughts that do not match the Idea. There will be the ultimate “Those who are not with us, are against us” time.

Does it remind us of something? Oh yes, and this something happened so recently, less than a century ago. However, only very few survivors (of that tragedy, the Communist revolution of 1917 and the subsequent decades of terror and genocide. –GP) remember the horrible pain of losing their families, friends, the pain of torture and deprivation. Very few of them are alive now. But even if they are alive and want to share their stories, nobody will ever listen to them. The headless, mindless Millions Who Are For The Idea are incapable of listening.

These headless creatures can be fought only using brutal physical force and deceit. Yet, my friends and colleagues do not know how to use force, and they cannot deceive. They haven’t accumulated enough brutality and enough skills to deceive, because they have always been too busy implementing the words of a Russian poet, Nekrasov, who said that the goal of a noble, decent person is to “saw the seeds of rationality, kindness, and eternity.” Therefore, at the moment, the outcome of the possible battle is quite obvious.

Well. I am no Batman. So the only thing I can do is to pray for all of us. As we all know, when the cannons talk, the muses are silent. Hardly can we expect that a song and dance will be of any use. Although… maybe it will. I know for sure that somewhere, deep inside me, there is still this voice, powerful, husky, and overcoming all indecisiveness or doubt. Continue reading

Nadja Tolokonnikowa: Putin hat Angst vor einer echten Opposition – wie er Angst vor Pussy Riot hatte

Kommentar von Nadja Tolokonnikowa, erschienen in The Guardian am 18. Juni 2014 (Übersetzung)

10390076_711106865613981_4914712596510624996_aEr hat gerade die Krim erobert. Er hat sich selbst zum Einiger proklamiert. Aber Wladimir Putins Einmischung in die Wahlen ist ein weiteres Zeichen dafür, dass seine Macht nicht so bedingungslos ist, wie er gerne glauben macht

Nachdem wir aus dem Gefängnis freigelassen wurden, haben Mascha Aljochina und ich ernsthaft darüber diskutiert, ob wir uns in der institutionellen Politik versuchen sollten, und dachten nach über eine Kandidatur bei den Wahlen für die Moskauer Stadtduma nach (die am 14. September sein werden). Aber nachdem wir ein “schweres Verbrechen” begangen haben, dürfen wir nach russischem Recht 10 Jahre nicht bei einer Wahl kandidieren.

Ende letzten Monats kündigten Nikolaj Ljaskin und Konstantin Jankauskas ihre Kandidatur für die Moskauer Stadtduma an. Sie gehören zu den stärksten Oppositionskandidaten, und ich kenne sie seit Jahren. Sie wissen, wie man sich in einem guten Kampf stellt. Continue reading

Schriftstellerin Sofi Oksanen: Wissen ist eine billige und allgemein verwendbare Waffe

Rede der finnisch-estnischen Schriftstellerin Sofi Oksanen bei der Internationalen Konferenz zum Thema “The Legacy of Totalitarismus Today” am 12. Juni 2014 in Prag

Im Folgenden ist der Wortlaut der Rede von Sofi Oksanen bei der Internationalen Konferenz zum Thema “The Legacy of Totalitarismus Today” (Das Erbe des Totalitarismus heute) im Parlament der Tschechischen Republik am 12. Juni 2014: Ursprünglich von “The European Platform for European Memory and Conscience” (Europäische Plattform für die europäische Erinnerung und Bewusstsein) veröffentlicht.
Übersetzung durch EuromaidanPR; der englischer Originaltext ist auf “” erschienen.

“Im Laufe dieses Frühjahrs haben die westlichen Medien mir ständig die gleichen Fragen gestellt, von Land zu Land und von Interview zu Interview:

  • Was will Putin?
  • Welches ist das nächste Land, das angegriffen wird? Wer ist der nächste?

Russische Soldaten ohne Kennzeichnung auf der Krim am 28.2.2014. Quelle: VOA/Wikipedia

Diese beiden Fragen enthalten schon die Vermutung, dass Russland die Krim nie an die Ukraine zurückgeben wird. Ich sage das, weil kein Journalist mich jemals gefragt hat, wann die Invasion der Krim beendet wird; und es scheint mir, sie brauchen nicht zu fragen, weil sie nämlich bereits glauben, dass es nie passieren wird, und ich bin sicher, wenn jeder das so macht, eben daran zu glauben, dann wird es in der Tat nie passieren. Sie fragen auch deswegen nicht, weil sie die Geschichte der Krim-Invasion nicht mehr verfolgen, denn ihr Interesse an dieser Geschichte verschwand bald nach der illegalen Annexion der Halbinsel durch Russland. Vielleicht hat die traditionellen Dramaturgie des westlichen Nachrichtenjournalismus daran die Schuld, denn sie folgt immer der Gestalt, die dem Vorfall ein Gesicht gegeben hat, in diesem Fall Putin, und das machte ihn zum Protagonisten der Geschichte. Und wenn sein Fokus absichtlich umgeschaltet wird auf andere Themen, dann folgen die Medien dem und lassen die Krim aus dem Blickwinkel verschwinden. Oder hat die Öffentlichkeit die Halbinsel schon vergessen, weil der Hype schon auf der östlichen Ukraine lag, mit einer sichtbaren Wirkung, einfach zu verkaufen, und ist sie damit den Wünschen Moskaus gefolgt?

Oder ist der Grund für das verlorene Interesse die grausame Tatsache, dass der Westen einfach nicht gut genug über die Halbinsel Krim weiß, um sich darum zu kümmern, und die meisten Menschen den Ort noch nie besucht haben? Wäre das Verständnis ein anderes, wenn der Protagonist der Invasion nicht Putin sondern ein Krimtatare wäre, der gezwungen wurde, seine Heimat zu verlassen und in andere Teile der Ukraine zu fliehen? Oder wenn die Hauptfigur ein örtlicher Oberschüler wäre, dem nicht mehr erlaubt ist, in seiner Muttersprache zu studieren? Continue reading

Arkadij Babtschenko: Krieg durch Hetze

Die folgende Übersetzung ist ursprünglich erschienen im Blog von Boris Reitschuster

Autor: Arkadij Babtschenko, bekannter russischer Journalist und einer der Mitbegründer der neuen Journalisten-Gewerkschaft gegen Propaganda

„Wenn Russland in die Ukraine nicht solche Flüsse von Lüge und Hass liefern würde, hätte dort im Osten nie ein Krieg begonnen. Kämpfer und Waffen – die sind natürlich ein sehr wichtiger Import-Posten – aber trotzdem – sie sind nur zweitrangig.
Das Wichtigste ist die Goebbels´sche Propaganda.

(Der Separatisten-Führer) Strelkow mit seinen Dämonen konnten nur auftauchen und die Verwaltungsgebäude besetzen, weil das Fernsehen die Leute mit dem „Rechten Sektor“ aufgehetzt hatte – der, so hieß es, werde jetzt nach dem Majdan mit Sicherheit kommen und alle Russen aufschlitzen. Ohne das wären die „grünen Männer“ (wie die Separatisten genannt werden) nicht möglich.

Ohne dieses Aufhetzen – hätten die Menschen in Donezk etwas unternommen? Hätten sie selbst Sabotage-Gruppen gegründet, mit Maschinenpistolen in der Hand Verwaltungsgebäude besetzt, Polizei- und Militärgebäude zerstört, dort Waffen erobert und mit denen in der Hand Grenzposten und Flughäfen gestürmt?

Die Antwort ist m.E. offensichtlich: Nein.

Flughäfen und Grenzposten passen auch gar nicht in diese Logik – die Logik der Verteidigung vom „Rechten Sektor“. Das ist völlig übertrieben. Das ist absolut offensichtlich.

Ja, Unmut und Angst vor dem Westen gab es im Osten wirklich. Und sogar recht massiv. Aber mit Flaggen „Russland, Russland“ zu schreiben – das ist das eine. Granatwerfer in die Hand zu nehmen, Panzerwagen anzuzünden und selbst zu sterben – das etwas ganz anderes.

Diesen Krieg hat nur und ausschließlich die Goebbels´sche Propaganda entfacht. Nichts anderes.

Weiterlesen auf der Seite von Boris Reitschuster (noch 200 Worte)

Russisches Experimentierfeld

Ursprünglich veröffentlicht auf
Quelle: Lewyj Bereg ( 3.6.2014 – Übersetzung von Anja Blume

Es gibt diesen deutschen Film „Das Experiment“. Ziemlich alt, er kam noch im Jahr 2000 auf die Bildschirme. Die Situation ist folgende: Eine Gruppe von Menschen hat sich freiwillig bereit erklärt, an einem sozialen Experiment teilzunehmen und kommt für zwei Wochen ins Gefängnis. Ein Teil der Gruppe spielte die Rolle der Wachen, der andere Teil die der Gefangenen. Alles, was verlangt wurde war, zwei Wochen unter den normalen Bedingungen eines deutschen Gefängnisses zu überleben und dafür Geld zu kriegen. Übrigens, das was zu Beginn wie ein unschuldiges Vergnügen erschien, verkehrte sich bald in eine Tragödie. Die Teilnehmer des Experiments, die in ihrer Rolle aufgingen, fingen an verrückt zu werden. Das Ganze endete mit Quälereien, Schlägereien und dem Verderben einiger Menschen.

Die Donezker Republik, das ist auch ein soziales Experiment. Ich bin überzeugt, dass das, was heute im Osten der Ukraine vor sich geht, in Kürze zu einem reichen Thema für wissenschaftliche Forschungsarbeiten und Dissertationen wird. Für junge Wissenschaftler der Ukraine ist es eine Sünde, sich über unzureichendes Material zu beklagen. Die Donezker Volksrepublik ist das „russische Experimentierfeld“ von dem der unvergessliche Jegor Letow (Sänger der Gruppe Grashdanskaja Oborona aus Omsk, 1964-2008) sang. Ein Truppenübungsplatz für PR-Leute, Politologen, Soziologen, Krieger. Ein Laboratorium des Kreml.


Foto: Maks Lewin

Das Experiment, das im Donbass von den Russen durchgeführt wird, ist nicht so schockierend, wie bei den medizinischen Experimenten des traurig berühmten Doktor Mengele, aber in Wahrheit nicht weniger unmenschlich. Vor den Augen der gesamten Welt leben Menschen, die auf einem abgesonderten Territorium leben, in einer neuen, ihnen zugewiesenen Rolle auf und verlieren den Verstand. Diese bestätigen in der Realität, die von den Kreml-PR-Leuten geschaffenen Szenarien, die lange vor dem Beginn des Bürgerkrieges (Antiterroroperation?) in der Ukraine geschrieben wurden.

Weiterlesen auf (noch 700 Worte)

Wer wird zum Lugansker Kadyrow?

333Ursprünglich veröffentlicht auf, Quelle: Realnaja Gaseta

Das Gebiet Lugansk verwandelt sich langsam in ein Schlachtfeld, auf dem nicht nur die Anhänger der Lugansker Volksrepublik gegen die ukrainische Armee kämpfen, sondern auch die Kriegsherren untereinander nicht einig sind. Der Gewinner erhält eine vorübergehende Kontrolle über die Region, zugleich eine wertvolle Chance – aufgrund der Kurzlebigkeit der «Lugansker Republik» – sich in der ukrainischen Politik legalisieren zu können.

Waräger statt Einheimische

Das Gebiet Lugansk hat, in gewissem Sinne, viel Glück, das klingt für viele Leser erst mal verrückt, die in der Nacht gezwungen sind, das Heulen der Sirenen und Gewehrfeuer zu hören. Dennoch ist unsere Region im Gegensatz zum Nachbarn Donezk in geringerem Ausmaße vom Feuer des Krieges erfasst. Nicht zuletzt wird das Gebiet weitgehend von den Bewohnern der Gegend kontrolliert, für welche viel auf dem Spiel steht. Die Taktik «der verbrannten Erde» ist hier nicht akzeptabel.

In Donezk und Slawjansk sind Einheimische tatsächlich aus der lokalen Führung entfernt worden. Slawjansks «Volksbürgermeister» Ponomarjow wurde durch den russischen Hobby-Weißgardisten Igor Strelkow-Girkin ersetzt und in Donezk selbst wurden der selbstausgerufene Vorsitzende der Donezker Volksrepublik Dennis Puschilin und der «Volksgouverneur» Pawel Gubarjew in Verlaufe eines unmerklichen Palastputschs von dem russischen Polittechnologen Alexander Borodaj ersetzt. Borodaj kontrolliert vollständig das Bataillon «Wostok», das zum Kern des Widerstands gegen Kiew in der Region Donezk geworden ist.

Weiterlesen auf: (500 Worte verbleiben) 

Provokationen, Stellvertreter und Glaubhafte Abstreitbarkeit

Russlands ferngesteuerter Krieg in der Ukraine

Quelle: Pierre Vaux, James Miller, Catherine A. Fitzpatrick für
16.6.2014. Übersetzung aus dem Englischen

Von Russland unterstützte Separatisten in der Ukraine. Photo von Reuters.

Russlands Militär- und Geheimdienstsektor ist seit Monaten aktiv am Konflikt in der Ostukraine beteiligt, diese Position wird von den Vereinigten Staaten, der Europäischen Union und den ukrainischen Behörden selbst vertreten. Doch Beweise, welche die russische Regierung endgültig der direkten Einmischung auf der anderen Seite der Grenze überführen, sind schwerer zu sammeln, da Wladimir Putin sich entschieden hat – zumindest vorerst – einen “besonderen Krieg” auf dem Gebiet seines Nachbarn zu führen, einen Krieg, der alle Kennzeichen einer Maskirovka trägt. Maskirovka ist ein in der sowjetischen Militärdoktrin etabliertes Prinzip der Tarnung, der Leugnung und der Täuschung. Die wichtigsten Merkmale der Maskirovka sind die Aufrechterhaltung der “Glaubhaften Abstreitbarkeit“, Verschleierung von Kräften und Desinformation sowie Täusch- oder Dummy-Strukturen, um die Fähigkeit des Gegners zu reduzieren, Vorhersagen zu treffen oder auf Aktionen zu reagieren.

Das Schlüsselelement in der aktuellen Krise in der Ukraine war die Fähigkeit des Kremls, trotz einer offenen Aggression, Einmischung und Invasion alles glaubhaft abstreiten zu können. Ohne diese Aufmachung wären die diplomatischen und wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen, von denen Russlands Einfluss abhängig ist, gefährdet. Dieser Einfluss ist sehr wichtig, insbesondere mit Blick auf die europäischen Staaten, die sehr lange zögern würden, ihre Geschäftsinteressen und Gasversorgung zu opfern.

Die Beziehungen wären einem viel stärkeren Risiko ausgesetzt gewesen, wenn Russland mit markierten Militäreinheiten in die Ukraine eingedrungen wäre. Indem die Krim von nicht markierten Truppen besetzt wurde, und die Präsenz russischer Streitkräfte bis zum Ende der Vorführung abgestritten wurde, schaffte sich Wladimir Putin den nötigen Raum, um Gesicht zu wahren. Kein Staatschef war bereit, Verluste in Kauf zu nehmen, wenn es nicht unbedingt sein musste. Die Invasion der Krim wurde von europäischen und amerikanischen Diplomaten noch als mögliches Zukunftsszenario behandelt, als schon lange klar war dass Russland eine militärische Invasion von souveränem europäischen Territorium begonnen hatte – und das war es schon im Laufe der ersten 24 Stunden nach Ankunft der “kleinen grünen Männchen” an den Flughäfen und VerwaltungsgebäudenContinue reading

Mychailo Wynnyckyj: Thoughts from Kyiv – 16 June 2014

Mychailo Wynnyckyj PhD Professor at Kyiv-Mohyla AcademyDuring the past few weeks I have relaxed somewhat. The Ukrainian Presidential election ran smoothly; President Poroshenko spoke brilliantly at the Rada on the occasion of his inauguration; news of the anti-terrorist operation in the eastern regions of Ukraine seemed to show that the ring around the Russian mercenaries was closing. So, I decided (like many in Kyiv), to return to my daily routine for a while. But Saturday’s downing of a military transport aircraft near Luhansk airport with 49 servicemen onboard, followed by today’s gas supply shut off (predictable, but nevertheless unpleasant), and news of renewed Russian troop movements on Ukraine’s eastern borders have got me worried again.

Trying to predict the future is a bad idea. I have been ribbed by several of my readers for having wrongly predicted imminent Russian invasion before.  I am not a psychologist, nor a psychotherapist – I don’t know what Putin is planning to do during the next couple of days/weeks. And it would seem that much depends on the decisions of this one man. Speculation as to his true motives abounds: amassing economic power (including personal wealth), expressing Russian nationalism (which could mean anything from Dugin-style Eurasianism to a more modest concern for Russian-speakers in the “near-abroad”), maintaining authoritarianism (i.e. fear of losing power due to a revolutionary demonstration effect). Putin’s motives are likely a combination of some or all of the above. Whatever the real state of affairs inside his head, the aggressive nature of the policies and actions of the Kremlin is becoming increasingly worrying: a local war in the Donbas has already started, and its spread seems increasingly inevitable.

Continue reading